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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the executive branch of the United States Government, the
Office of the Attorney General sits at the head of the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), an agency that houses the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(“EOIR”).1 The EOIR has the privilege of operating the United States’ entire
immigration adjudication system.2 One of the many powers bestowed upon
Attorneys General is the power to certify and refer a case to themselves, so
they can issue a precedential decision that may or may not
overrule existing precedent issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA” or the “Board”).3 Perhaps one of the most critical precedential
decisions issued by an Attorney General, which changed how immigration
lawyers (and judges) practiced immigration law, was recently handed
down when Jefferson B. Sessions, the 84th Attorney General, decided
Matter of Castro-Tum in 2018.4
Immigration judges have historically exercised their discretion and
authority to manage their dockets through the usage of administrative closure,
the process by which they temporarily remove a case from their active
calendar or docket.5 However, in 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
moved away from the precedent set by the Board in Matter of Avetisyan and
Matter of W-Y-U and stripped this authority from immigration judges and BIA
members when he decided Matter of Castro-Tum.6 In this groundbreaking
decision, Attorney General Jeff Sessions held that “judges and the Board do
not have the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration
proceedings by administrative closure.”7 Further, he stated that immigration
judges and BIA members had relied on regulations that only allowed the
use of administrative closure in specific categories of cases; and that

1

About the Office, THE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (Feb. 3, 2021).

2

Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Executive Office For Immigration Review, THE U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-executiveoffice-immigration-review (Jan. 3, 2022); see The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration
Courts Became a Deportation Tool, S. POVERTY L. CTR (June 25, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/
20190625/attorney-generals-judges-how-us-immigration-courts-became-deportation-tool.
3
Richard Frankel, Deporting Chevron: Why the Attorney General’s Immigration Decisions Should
Not Receive Chevron Deference, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 547, 548 (2020).
4
Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ Opinion in the Matter of Castro-Tum, THE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-opinion-matter-castro-tum (June 11, 2018).
It is important to note that this case has been recently overturned after President Biden took office;
however, this Comment discusses the tremendous influence and power that the Attorney General has, and
how easy it is for an Attorney General to cause shifts in the system that are capable of generating nothing
but havoc, and why it is of the utmost importance that immigration judges control their own dockets
without any interference from the Attorney General. See Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I. & N. Dec. 326, 329
(B.I.A. 2021) (stating that Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018), departed from
the long-standing practice of allowing immigration judges to control their own dockets).
5
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 692 (B.I.A. 2012); Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 271.
6
See generally Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 292.
7
Id. at 271.
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“[n]either section 1003.10(b) nor section 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) confers the
authority to grant administrative closure.”8
By deciding Matter of Castro-Tum, the Attorney General severely
curtailed longstanding principles established by the Board that supported
using administrative closure. Although there were still some instances where
judges could apply administrative closure despite the precedent set in
Matter of Castro-Tum, the Attorney General ended the practice of a powerful
and practical docket management tool that immigration judges had used for
decades.9 Prior to Matter of Castro-Tum, in Matter of Avetisyan, the Board
had expanded this tool by holding that an immigration judge could close
a case even after the objection of one party; and it established an array of
factors for a judge to follow when determining whether administrative closure
would be appropriate.10 Furthermore, in Matter of W-Y-U, the Board held that
a primary consideration for an immigration judge to determine whether
to grant administrative closure was “whether the party opposing
administrative closure [had] provided a persuasive reason for the case to
proceed and be resolved on the merits.”11
This decision was controversial, to the point that a year after the
Attorney General’s decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued
a decision overturning Matter of Castro-Tum.12 Moreover, a year later, in
2020, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Fourth Circuit
Court’s lead and issued a similar decision overturning the Attorney General’s
decision.13 On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit of Appeals criticized the
Fourth and Seventh Circuit Court’s rationale and upheld abolishing
administrative closure, backing Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ decision and
creating a split among the circuit courts.14 More circuit courts joined the
dispute; the Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Fourth and Seventh
8
Id. at 284. “In deciding the individual cases before them, and subject to the applicable governing
standards, immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion and may take any
action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for
the disposition of such cases.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2019).
Board members shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion in
considering and determining the cases coming before the Board, and a panel or
Board member to whom a case is assigned may take any action consistent with their
authorities under the Act and the regulations as is appropriate and necessary for the
disposition of the case.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2019).
9
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1214.3 (2019) (“If the alien appears eligible for V nonimmigrant status, the
immigration judge or the Board, whichever has jurisdiction, shall administratively close the proceeding or
continue the motion indefinitely.”); Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigr. J., on
Continuances and Administrative Closure to All Immigr. JJ. et al. 3 (March 7, 2013) (on file with U.S.
Dept. Just.) [hereinafter J. O’Leary Memo (2013)].
10
Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 693–96.
11
Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17, 20 (B.I.A. 2017).
12
See Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 297 (4th Cir. 2019) (overturning Matter of Castro-Tum,
27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018)).
13
See Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656, 667 (7th Cir. 2020) (overturning Matter of Castro-Tum,
27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018)).
14
See generally Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2020).
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Circuit Court’s rationale and overturned Matter of Castro-Tum.15 Although
the Seventh, Fourth, and Third Circuit Courts brought back a glimmer of hope
that administrative closure would be restored as a docket management tool,
the fact that these decisions were only binding within their Circuits shows
there was a need for more action by the Supreme Court or Congress to remedy
this situation.16
Consequently, in response to the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Court’s
decisions, the EOIR published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
August 2020 (“NPRM”) seeking to amend, inter alia, sections 1003.10 and
1003.1 of the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) to establish that
immigration judges do not have the general authority to administratively close
cases.17 The EOIR published a final rule (the “Rule”) in December of that
same year, and the regulation became effective as of January 2021.18
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in March 2021, issued a nationwide
preliminary injunction to enjoin the EOIR from “[i]mplementing or enforcing
the Rule . . . .”19 This injunction meant that administrative closure would be
available in jurisdictions that had rejected Matter of Castro-Tum.
After discussing the current situation in the immigration system and
how Matter of Castro-Tum affected the practice of Immigration Law, Part II
will examine the background and applicability of discretionary closure over
the past three decades and how immigration judges have enjoyed using this
docket management tool.
Part III will examine and discuss why
administrative closure should have remained available as a discretionary tool
for judges to use instead of other tools available and examine ways
President Biden could have restored it prior to Matter of Castro-Tum being
overturned. Part IV will conclude by explaining that the EOIR should have
repealed or amended the Rule published at the end of 2020, why Matter of
Castro-Tum should have been overturned, and that immigration judges should
permanently have the authority to use administrative closure in removal
proceedings when necessary.

See Sanchez v. Atty’y Gen. United States, 997 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2021).
Fourth Circuit Strikes Down Attorney General Opinion, Restores Fundamental Power to
Immigration Judges, AM. IMMIGR. LAW.’S ASS’N, (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/
press-releases/2019/aila-fourth-circuit-strikes-down-attorney-general.
17
See Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative
Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 52491, 52492 (proposed Aug. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003 and
1240).
18
85 Fed. Reg. 81588 (Dec. 16, 2020).
19
Centro Legal de La Raza et al., v. Exec. Office for Immigr. Rev., 524 F. Supp. 3d 919, 980 (N.D.
Cal. 2021). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handles the highest amount of immigration cases due to
its geographic scope, mainly because of California. Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Courts,
MYATTORNEYUSA, http://myattorneyusa.com/jurisdiction-of-the-federal-circuit-courts (last visited May
3, 2022).
15
16
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BACKGROUND

A. The Attorney General
The Attorney General’s office has existed for over two centuries after
Congress created it through the Judiciary Act of 1789.20 One of the Attorney
General’s primary duties is to prosecute and advise the President on questions
of law.21 The Attorney General, who is appointed by the President, is the head
of the DOJ, an executive agency within the cabinet that guides the “world’s
largest law office.”22
When Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) in 1952, it conferred to the Attorney General the task of creating
a functioning immigration system.23 Because of this obligation, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service agency (“INS”) was located within
this system.24 The INS was tasked with implementing and adjudicating
immigration laws and deciding deportation cases.25 The INS officers lacked
independence mainly because the Attorney General employed them.26
In 1983, after several structuring concerns were raised, the Attorney General
decided to create the EOIR, housing both the immigration courts and the
Board, to achieve a working immigration system.27
The EOIR is tasked with adjudicating immigration cases by
administering the immigration laws of the country.28 The Board handles
appeals from the immigration courts throughout the nation, and it is regarded
as the “highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration
laws.”29 When the Board reviews appeals, it constructs binding precedential
decisions on all immigration courts in the United States, “unless modified or

20
Attorney General, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/attorney-general (last visited
May 3, 2022).
21
Id. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established a six-member Supreme Court and the renowned position
of Attorney General by declaring that the attorney general shall “prosecute and conduct all suits in the
Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon
questions of law when required by the President of the United States . . . .” The Judiciary Act of 1789,
GEO. WASH. MOUNT VERNON, https://www.mountvernon.org/education/primary-sources-2/article/thejudiciary-act-of-1789/ (last visited May 3, 2022).
22
Office of Attorney Recruitment & Management, THE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
oarm (last visited May 3, 2022); Executive Agencies, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/administrativelaw/executive-agencies/ (last visited May 3, 2022); The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-executive-branch/ (last visited May 3, 2022).
23
S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 2.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Dory Mitros Durham, Note: The Once and Future Judge: The Rise and Fall (And Rise?)
of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 658 (2006).
27
S. POVERTY L. CTR. supra note 2; see also U.S. DEP’T. JUST., supra note 1.
28
U.S. DEP’T. JUST., supra note 1.
29
Board of Immigration Appeals, THE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-ofimmigration-appeals (last visited May 3, 2022); THE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., supra note 1.
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overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court.”30 The importance of
the Board cannot be overstated because, as the body that generally construes
and applies new immigration regulations and statutes, “[i]t [also] interprets
and applies new court decisions.”31 Accordingly, the Board issues numerous
decisions each year.32
The INS remained within the DOJ until President George Bush
enacted the Homeland Security Act (“HSA”) in 2002, which established the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).33 The DHS incorporated
the INS and transferred it to three newly created agencies within the
Department.34 Mainly, the HSA transferred the INS’s adjudication authority
to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), which
essentially abolished the INS, giving the immigration system a sense of
independence and fairness.35
i.

The Attorney General’s Power

The Attorney General possesses broad power in the immigration
context. When the Attorney General created the BIA, he retained review
authority, also known as “agency head review.”37 Per the CFR, the Attorney
General may review on certification “(1) cases that the AG directs be referred
to him; (2) cases that the BIA refers to the AG for consideration; and (3) cases
that the [DHS] refers to the AG for review.”38 As established by the
regulations, the Attorney General can use that certification power and issue
final, binding agency decisions, which serve as precedent for future cases. 39
The Attorney General uses this certification power to enact agency-binding
decisions and carry out changes to the immigration law field.40 Aside from
36

30
U.S. DEP’T. JUST., supra note 30; Jennifer Safstrom, An Analysis of the Applications and
Implications of Chevron Deference in Immigration, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 53, 54 (2019).
31
Maurice A. Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 29, 36 (1977).
32
Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General
Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1767 (2010).
33
H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted); Andrew Glass, Bush creates Homeland Security
Department, Nov. 26, 2002, POLITICO (Nov. 11, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/
11/26/this-day-in-politics-november-26-1012269.
34
The Homeland Security Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9central/handbook-for-employers-m-274/10-why-employers-must-verify-employment-authorization-andidentity-of-new-employees/11-the-homeland-security-act (Apr. 27, 2020) (Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; U.S. Customs and Border Patrol; and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services).
35
Durham, supra note 27, at 680.
36
Frankel, supra note 3, at 558 (One example of this broad power is the fact that immigration judges
and BIA members are subordinates of the Attorney General); “The Attorney General’s authority on review
is extraordinarily broad . . . .” Trice, supra note 33, at 1767.
37
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(7), 1003.1(h) (2019); Frankel, supra note 3, at 561; U.S. DEP’T. JUST., supra
note 1.
38
Andrew R. Arthur, AG Certification Explained: A legal way for the AG to set immigration policy
and guide IJ and BIA discretion, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Nov. 05, 2019), https://cis.org/Arthur/AGCertification-Explained; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2019).
39
Trice, supra note 33, at 1767.
40
Id. at 1770, 1771. “[T]he authority allows the attorney general to review and overrule decisions
made by the [BIA] . . . .” Sarah Pierce, Obscure but Powerful: Shaping U.S. Immigration Policy through
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this certification tool, the Attorney General also possesses the authority to
issue regulations through adjudication and rulemaking.41
The Attorney General’s power can also be found in the INA.42 The
INA gives the Attorney General authority to supervise all immigration
proceedings.43 Per the INA, the Attorney General has the authority
to “establish such regulations, . . . issue such instructions, review such
administrative determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such
authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General determines to
be necessary . . . .”44 Among the authority to supervise immigration
proceedings, the statutes also state that the proceedings conducted by
immigration judges “shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform
such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe . . . .”45
ii. Department of Justice Hierarchy
Because the DOJ is an executive agency, the head of the Department,
the Attorney General, is subject to “unlimited presidential removal
authority . . . .”46 The Attorney General appoints immigration judges, who
have the title of “judges” but are neither Article III nor Article I judges; they
are “administrative judges.”47 Per the INA, immigration judges are
considered subordinates of the Attorney General, and their employment does
not have protection or tenure, unlike a judge under Article III. 48 The
Attorney General can hire immigration judges whenever it is deemed
Attorney
General
Referral
and
Review,
MIGRATION
POL’Y
INST.
(Jan.
2021),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/obscure-powerful-immigration-attorney-general-referral-review.
41
Frankel, supra note 3, at 560. Adjudication and Rulemaking are types of administrative action that
an agency can take to create binding decisions upon either an individual or a group of people. Jeffry J.
Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. STATE UNIV. L. REV.
529, 530 (2005). Agencies have, historically, had the discretion to choose from either act as a tool to
develop policy. Id.
42
Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, § 103 (1952) (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537).
43
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 282 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
44
INA § 103(g)(2).
45
INA § 101(b)(4).
46
Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law (8th ed. 2019). See, e.g., Tessa Berenson, President
Trump Wanted to Fire Attorney General Jeff Sessions for Not ‘Protecting’ Him. The Constitution Says
That’s OK, TIME (Jan. 5, 2018, 4:41 PM), https://time.com/5089974/president-trump-power-fire-attorneygeneral/ (Trump fired Jeff Sessions after he recused himself from the Russia investigation).
47
The Attorney General’s Judges: How the U.S. Immigration Courts Became a Deportation Tool, S.
POVERTY L. CTR. 7 (June 25, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_policyreport_the_
attorney_generals_judges_final.pdf (Article III judges derive their authority from the judicial branch, and
judges who derive their authority under Article I conduct proceedings under the Administrative Procedure
Act); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a) (2019).
48
INA § 101(b)(4) (“An immigration judge shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform
such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe, but shall not be employed by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.”); Board of Immigration Appeals; Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management; Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 54878, 54893 (“Each Board member is a Department of Justice
attorney who is appointed by, and may be removed or reassigned by, the Attorney General [and are] . . .
subject to removal by the Attorney General . . . .”); About Federal Judges, U.S. CT.’S,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/about-federal-judges (last visited May 3, 2022) (judges “hold
their office during good behavior”).

Published by eCommons, 2022

204

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

necessary.49
Furthermore, the Attorney General also appoints the
Chief Immigration Judge, the individual tasked with providing program
direction and implementing new policies for all immigration judges in the
nation.50
B. Administrative Closure
Administrative closure is a “procedural tool created for the
convenience of the Immigration Courts and the Board.”51 The BIA and
immigration judges have used it in removal proceedings “to await an action
or event that is relevant to immigration proceedings but is outside the control
of the parties or the court and may not occur for a significant or undetermined
period of time.”52 Most frequently, this tool has been used in cases when the
noncitizen was awaiting a decision from another agency, mainly the USCIS.53
Moreover, administrative closure does not terminate proceedings; it grants
DHS the opportunity to “recalendar” the case before the immigration judge
and resume proceedings at any time.54 It has been used mainly to “regulate
proceedings” as a matter of practicality.55 Thus, the judge issues no final
order when this tool is used.56
i.

Evolution of Administrative Closure

The existence of this docket management tool in the immigration law
field dates back to the 1980s when the Chief Immigration Judge established
an operating policy allowing immigration judges to use, among other tools,
administrative closure in cases in which the noncitizen failed to appear
at a hearing.57 The first time the Board addressed administrative closure was
49
See e.g., Memorandum Jeffery Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., on Renewing Our Commitment to the
Timely and Efficient Adjudication of Immigration Cases to Serve the National Interest to the Exec. Off.
For Immigr. Rev for the Exec. Off. For Immigr. Rev. (Dec. 5, 2017 (the Attorney General hired 50 new
immigration judges in 2017).
50
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, THE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge-bios (Apr. 20, 2022).
51
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 690 (B.I.A. 2012).
52
Id. at 692.
53
Practice Advisory: The Return of Administrative Closure, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. 1, 8 (Jul.
2020); see e.g., Petition for Alien Relative, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S,
https://www.uscis.gov/i-130 (May 6, 2022) (USCIS adjudication of a family-based petition).
54
“Administrative closure serves the interest of both parties . . . [b]y suspending activity in cases that
are not (and may never be) ripe for adjudication . . . .” Brief for Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 3, Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (No. A 206842-910). “Administrative closure is simply a version of a stay that removes a case from ‘active status’
on a court’s docket.” Id. at 6. “While a case is administratively closed, any party may file a “motion to
recalendar” with the Immigration Court or the BIA (whichever body closed the case) in order to have the
case returned to the active docket.” Practice Advisory, Administrative Closure and Motions to Recalendar,
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 13–14 (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/

default/files/practice_advisory/practice_advisory_administrative_closure_and_motions_to_recalendar.pdf.
55

Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Memorandum from William R. Robie, Chief Immigr. J., on Cases in Which
Respondents/Applicants Fail to Appear for Hearing to All Immigr. JJ. 1 (Mar. 7, 1984) (on file with U.S.
Dept. of Just.) [hereinafter J. Robie Memo].
56
57
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in Matter of Amico in 1988.58 In that case, the respondent failed to appear
at his final hearing after the judge had issued several continuances; therefore,
the judge ultimately administratively closed the respondent’s case.59
To support this decision, the Board stated that it wanted to ensure “proper use
of the administrative closing procedure.”60
For over a decade after the decision in Matter of Amico, the Board
held as precedent that a judge could only grant administrative closure when
both parties supported it.61 For example, in 1990, when the Board decided
Matter of Lopez-Barrios, it held that the “administrative closing procedure
should not be used if it is opposed by either party to the proceedings.”62
The Board applied the same ruling under Lopez-Barrios six years later when
it decided Gutierrez-Lopez.63
In 2012, the Board addressed the usage of administrative closure once
again when it decided Matter of Avetisyan.64 To employ the use
of administrative closure, the Board addressed the powers and duties
delegated to it by law and the Attorney General to regulate the course of the
hearing.65 The Board reproved the rule stated in Gutierrez-Lopez that a case
may not be administratively closed if either party opposes because
it generated direct conflict with “the delegated authority of the Immigration
Judges and the Board . . . .”66 Furthermore, the Board stated that “[t]he circuit
courts and the Board have rejected the notion that a party to proceedings may
exercise absolute veto power over the authority of an Immigration Judge or
the Board to act . . . .”67 Under this rationale, the Board held that immigration
judges and Board members have the authority to administratively close
proceedings through their discretion and independent judgment—even if
a party opposes.68 The Board overruled Gutierrez-Lopez and established six
guiding factors to better the courts’ assessment of when administrative closure
would be appropriate.69

58
Elizabeth Montano, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Closure in Immigration Courts, 129 YALE
L.J. F. 567, 570 (2020).
59
Matter of Amico, 19 I. & N. Dec. 652, 653 (B.I.A. 1988); Montano, supra note 59, at 570–71.
60
Amico, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 653.
61
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 274 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
62
Matter of Lopez Barrios, 20 I. & N. Dec. 203, 204 (B.I.A. 1990).
63
Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 479, 480 (B.I.A. 1996).
64
See generally Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012).
65
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b).
66
Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 693.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 694.
69
Id. at 696 (“(1) the reason administrative closure is sought; (2) the basis for any opposition to
administrative closure; (3) the likelihood the respondent will succeed on any petition, application, or other
action he or she is pursuing outside of removal proceedings; (4) the anticipated duration of the closure; (5)
the responsibility of either party, if any, in contributing to any current or anticipated delay; and (6) the
ultimate outcome of removal proceedings (for example, termination of the proceedings or entry of a
removal order) when the case is recalendared before the Immigration Judge or the appeal is reinstated
before the Board.”).
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Five years after the decision in Matter of Avetisyan, the Board
decided Matter of W-Y-U, addressing administrative closure one last time
before its abolishment in Matter of Castro-Tum.70 In this case, the respondent,
a Chinese citizen in the midst of removal proceedings, was disputing the
administrative closure of his case.71 He had filed a timely asylum application
and argued that the administrative closure of his case would prevent him from
pursuing that relief.72 The immigration judge in the case explained that
“he denied the respondent’s motion to recalendar and kept his case
administratively closed to reserve the Immigration Court’s ‘limited
adjudication resources . . . .’”73 However, on appeal, the Board held that the
respondent had a right to a hearing on the merits because he might be eligible
for lawful status; meanwhile, having his case administratively closed
provided no legal benefit.74 Ultimately, the Board held that when determining
whether to administratively close or “recalendar” a case in removal
proceedings, a judge needed to consider whether the opposing party had
provided enough justification for the case to proceed and be resolved.75
Despite these recent developments where the courts shaped
administrative closure and its use, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions put
an end to this practice in 2018 when he decided Matter of Castro-Tum.76
Upon directing the BIA to refer Matter of Castro-Tum for his review, he held
that neither Immigration Judges nor the Board have the general authority to
use administrative closure to suspend removal proceedings for an indefinite
period.77 He based his decision primarily on the premise that there had been
an increase in administratively closed cases between 2011 and 2017.78
The former Attorney General further stated that the DOJ only allows a judge
or the Board to use administrative closure in specific cases.79 When issuing
this decision, Sessions’ reasoning also relied on using the motion for
continuance as an apt alternative to administrative closure.80

70

Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 17, 17 (B.I.A. 2017).
Id.
Id.
73
Id. at 18; AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra at 54, at 13–14 (“While a case is administratively closed,
any party may file a ‘motion to recalendar’ with the Immigration Court or the BIA (whichever body closed
the case) in order to have the case returned to the active docket.”).
74
W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 19.
75
Id. at 20.
76
See generally Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
77
Id. at 272.
78
Id. at 273 (“Statistics maintained by EOIR reveal that over three decades, from EOIR Fiscal Year
1980 to Fiscal Year 2011, 283,366 cases were administratively closed. But in a mere six years, from
October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2017, immigration judges and the Board ordered administrative
closure in 215, 285 additional cases, nearly doubling the total number of cases subjected to administrative
closure.”).
79
Id. at 274.
80
Id. at 291.
71
72
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ii. Post Matter of Castro-Tum
This decision created confusion and triggered responses
from different entities.
After Attorney General Sessions overruled
Matter of Avetisyan and Matter of W-Y-U in 2018, the American Immigration
Lawyers Association (“AILA”) and the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation (“ACLU”) issued a practice advisory for all immigration lawyers
to be aware of this systematic change.81
In 2019, a year after
Matter of Castro-Tum was decided, the Fourth Circuit Court decided
Zuniga Romero v. Barr, in which the court vacated Matter of Castro-Tum.82
In ruling for the vacatur, the Fourth Circuit Court reasoned that the CFR
confers unambiguous authority to immigration judges and the Board to
administratively close cases.83
In 2020, the Seventh Circuit Court decided Morales v. Barr, in which
the Court, under similar reasoning as the Fourth Circuit Court, rejected
Matter of Castro-Tum and held that immigration judges and the Board have
the general authority to administratively close a case.84 As a response to these
decisions, the EOIR and the DOJ issued an NPRM, in which the agency
proposed to amend, inter alia, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) to
make clear that these provisions provide no “freestanding” power to
Immigration Judges and the Board to administratively close cases.85
At the end of 2020, another case regarding administrative closure was
decided.86 Through the issuance of Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, which
affirmed the Attorney General’s decision, the Sixth Circuit Court appeared to

81
Administrative Closure Post Castro-Tum Practice Advisory, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL & AMER. C.L.
UNION FOUND., 1 https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/
administrative_closure_post-castro-tum.pdf (Oct. 22, 2019) (“This practice advisory provides a brief
overview of administrative closure and explains the impact of the Attorney General’s decision on the future
availability of administrative closure, as well as on cases that are currently administratively closed.”). The
American Civil Liberties Union is a nonprofit organization founded to protect people’s rights, with a
trajectory that dates back more than 100 years. About the ACLU, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/about-aclu
(last visited May 4, 2022). The American Immigration Lawyers Association is the national association of
lawyers and professors that teach and practice immigration law. About, AM. IMMIGR. LAW.’S ASS’N,
https://www.aila.org/about (last visited May 4, 2022).
82
Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 297 (4th Cir. 2019).
83
Id. at 292.
84
Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656, 667 (7th Cir. 2020); United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Seventh_Circuit
(May 2, 2022) (The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals oversees appeals from district courts located in
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin).
85
Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure,
85 Fed. Reg. 52491, 52503 (Aug. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1249); see also
Administrative Rulemaking, LAW SHELF, https://lawshelf.com/videocoursesmoduleview/administrativerulemaking-module-3-of-5/ (last visited May 5, 2022) (“Rulemaking is the process by which administrative
agencies adopt binding rules of general applicability as a means of furthering the statutory mandate of the
agency.”).
86
Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2020).
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strike back at the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts.87 In that case,
Roberto Hernandez-Serrano was “very close to being able to adjust [his]
status” when the court denied his appeal and motion to remand based on
administrative closure.88 The court relied on the fact that continuances are
an optimal replacement for administrative closure and that Mr. HernandezSerrano could have easily sought one.89 This decision further augmented the
dispute about whether administrative closure should be allowed as a tool for
immigration judges and the BIA, which has created a split among the different
circuit courts.90
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Use of Administrative Closure has been Authorized and
Encouraged
i.

Statutes and Regulations

When he decided Matter of Castro-Tum, Attorney General Sessions
tirelessly stated that no general authority to administratively close cases had
been conferred upon the Board or immigration judges.91 However, his posture
presented an erroneous view. Various statutes enacted by the INA, coupled
with many regulations promulgated by past Attorneys General, granted
immigration judges powers much like the ones Article III judges possess,
including the authority to administratively close a case.92 Immigration judges
have been granted the power to decide whether a respondent in deportation
proceedings will face removal or be allowed to stay in the country.93 Because
of the critical responsibility of determining whether an individual’s life will
change substantially, the BIA and immigration judges have been afforded the

87
Id. at 461 (“A regulation delegating to immigration judges authority to take certain actions ‘[i]n
deciding the individual cases before them’ does not delegate to them general authority not to decide those
cases at all.”).
88
Id. To adjust status refers to the process by which a noncitizen applies for permanent residency in
the United States. Adjustment of Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S, https://www.uscis.gov/
green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/adjustment-of-status (Sept. 25, 2020).
89
Hernandez-Serrano, 981 F.3d at 464 (“That is what continuances are for; and the Attorney General
has expressly delegated to [Immigration Judges’] IJs authority to ‘grant a motion for continuance for good
cause shown.’”).
90
Farah Al-khersan, Sixth Circuit Issues Decision Regarding Administrative Closure, AL-KHERSAN
LAW (Nov. 7, 2020), https://mcarlinlaw.com/sixth-circuit-issues-decision-regarding-administrativeclosure/. A “circuit split” occurs when two or more regional circuits have conflicting decisions about a
certain legal matter, often resolved by the Supreme Court. See Wyatt G. Sassman, How Circuits Can Fix
Their Splits, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2020).
91
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 272 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
92
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(v) (2020).
93
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2018).
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necessary tools to conduct hearings, administrative closure being one of
them.94
Former Attorneys General promulgated different regulations that
explicitly grant the BIA and immigration judges broad powers to conduct
hearings efficiently.95 One of these regulations is 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b),
which authorizes immigration judges to “exercise their independent judgment
and discretion and . . . take any action consistent with their authorities under
the Act and regulations that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition
of such cases.”96 A similar regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), which
confers the BIA broad authority over immigration proceedings, states that
“Board members shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion in
considering and determining the cases . . . and . . . may take any action . . .
appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case.”97 This language
found in the regulations and statutes is evidence that Congress and past
Attorneys General have allotted immigration judges and the Board the power
to, among other things, administratively close a case if they deemed
it “appropriate” or “necessary.”98
In Matter of Castro-Tum, Attorney General Sessions reasoned
that the BIA and immigration judges do not have the authority to
use administrative closure because such adjudicatory authority
was not explicitly mentioned in either section 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) or
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), and analyzed that there is a nonexistent basis for
assuming they have such authority.99 He further reasoned that judges should
rely on their authority to grant continuances, a power expressly conferred in
the regulations.100 In 1987, the DOJ established 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, which
ratified the inherent authority that immigration judges possess to grant
continuances.101 Nevertheless, because administrative closure pauses
removal proceedings for an indefinite period while a simultaneous process is
being completed, it is a type of continuance.102 This rationale signifies the

94
Brief for Retired Immigration Judges and Former Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (No. A 206-842910) [hereinafter Brief of Retired Judges] (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).
95
Id. at 10–11 (“DOJ promulgated a regulation ratifying the inherent authority for Immigration
Judges to grant continuances.”).
96
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) (2020).
97
Id. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).
98
Id. § 1003.10(b) (Immigration judges have the power to administer oaths, issue administrative
subpoenas, interrogate, and so forth).
99
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 285 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
100
Id. at 282.
101
Brief of Retired Judges, supra note 95, at 10; Council, Practice Advisory, Motions for A
Continuance, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1 (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
sites/default/files/practice_advisory/motions_for_a_continuance_practice_advisory.pdf (“A continuance
is a docket-management tool that an Immigration Judge (IJ) may utilize to move an upcoming hearing from
one scheduled date to another or to pause an ongoing hearing and move it to a future date.”).
102
Brief of Retired Judges, supra note 95, at 10–11.
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authority the BIA and immigration judges have to grant administrative
closure.
ii. Memoranda
The use of this docket management tool has also been encouraged
and authorized by the constant issuance of various documents and memoranda
by the DOJ throughout the years.103 As mentioned above, one of the first
occasions where administrative closure was promoted dates back to 1984,
when the DOJ issued a memorandum to all immigration judges.104 In that
instance, the Chief Immigration Judge, William R. Robie, issued an operating
policy for cases in removal proceedings where the respondent failed to appear
at a hearing.105 The memorandum issued by the Chief Immigration Judge
suggested that immigration judges have various options available to them
when deciding a case of this nature.106 The Chief Immigration Judge made
clear that it was ultimately up to the judges’ discretion to employ adequate
action according to their judgment, which would suggest that, for more than
three decades, immigration judges have had the ability to choose the
necessary and appropriate methods for deciding a case.107
The Chief Immigration Judge’s memorandum is not the sole
document issued by the DOJ mentioning administrative closure as
a viable option for immigration judges; in 2013, Brian M. O’Leary,
the Chief Immigration Judge at that time, issued another memorandum
advocating for the use of continuances and administrative closure.108 Aside
from reassuring judges that they have decisional independence pursuant to
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10, the memorandum further stated that judges have to ensure
that the resources available to them are applied to resolve disputes. 109
The language of the 2013 memorandum stated that “[a]dministrative closure
is a legitimate method of removing a case from the court’s active docket,”
was acutely clear regarding the validity of administrative closure as a docket
management tool.110
Chief Immigration Judge Brian M. O’Leary issued another
memorandum in 2015 alluding to the use of administrative closure in Special
Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) cases.111 In that memorandum, he stated that
See J. O’Leary Memo (2013), supra note 9, at 1–2, 5.
J. Robie Memo, supra note 58, at 1, 3.
105
Id. at 1.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
J. O’Leary Memo (2013), supra note 9, at 1, 5.
109
Id. at 1.
110
Id. at 2.
111
See Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigr. J., on Docketing Practices Relating to
Unaccompanied Children Cases and Adults with Children Released on Alternatives to Detention Cases in
Light of the New Priorities to All Immigr. JJ. (March 24, 2015) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Just.) [hereinafter
J. O’Leary Memo (2015)]; Green Card Based on Special Immigrant Juvenile Classification, U.S.
103
104
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an SIJ case needed to be administratively closed for it to be adjudicated.112
These guidance documents and policy-promoting memoranda reinforce the
fact that the BIA and immigration judges possess the authority to
administratively close a case when needed.
iii. Federal Courts
Attorney General Sessions reasoned in Matter of Castro-Tum that,
unlike Article III judges, immigration judges and the Board do not have
inherent power, generally, to employ administrative closure.113 However,
the Supreme Court announced in 1936 that courts have the power to control
the disposition of their dockets in a manner that is both time-efficient and
economical and that to accomplish this task, courts have to use “judgment
[that] must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.”114
Furthermore, federal courts like the First Circuit Court of Appeals have
stressed that administrative closure is one of many tools that judges use in
many districts throughout the country to “shelve pending, but dormant,
cases.”115
Other circuit courts have also issued opinions regarding the use of
administrative closure; a notable example of this is a decision by the Third
Circuit Court, which held that “[d]istrict courts often use administrative
closings to prune their overgrown dockets.”116 The purpose of administrative
closure is the same throughout the federal court system, including the
immigration court system—to unclog immigration judges’ congested dockets
to make room for cases ready for adjudication.117 By stating that neither
the Board nor immigration judges have the authority to administratively close
cases, the Attorney General is depriving judges of a necessary means of
relieving their dockets of clutter.
Moreover, the difference between the number of federal judges and
immigration judges in the nation is staggering. There are currently 816 active
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S, https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-eligibility/green-cardbased-on-special-immigrant-juvenile-classification (Apr. 5, 2018) (“The Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ)
classification provides certain children who have been subject to state juvenile court proceedings related
to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under state law the ability to seek lawful permanent
residence in the United States.”).
112
J. O'Leary Memo (2015), supra note 112, at 2.
113
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 291 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
114
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936)).
115
Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio L.L.C., 166 F.3d 389, 392 (1st Cir. 1999).
116
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, L.L.C., 709 F.3d 240, 247 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Penn West
Associates v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2004) (After reaching a settlement agreement, the court
ordered the case closed, which could be reopened if the agreement fell apart)).
117
The Life and Death of Administrative Closure, TRAC IMMIGR. (Sept. 10, 2020),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/623/ (“Administrative closures have allowed judges to temporarily
close cases and take them off their active docket either because judges wish to focus limited resources on
higher priority removal cases or because jurisdictional issues were prolonging the case. Often
administrative closure is used when a case’s outcome is affected by applications pending for decision
before another government body, such as [USCIS].”).
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judges serving at the federal level, compared to only 535 immigration
judges.118 This imbalance means more judges are available to adjudicate
cases in the federal court system than in the immigration court system.
More importantly, statistics show that the number of federal cases has
declined while the number of cases at the immigration level has increased.119
With the current volume of pending immigration cases nationwide,
immigration judges need tools that will help them manage their dockets and
prioritize cases to de-clog the system and preserve resources.
B. Administrative Closure is More Efficient than Other Tools Available
When he decided Matter of Castro-Tum, the Attorney General
effectively limited the number of tools available to immigration judges that
could be used to adjudicate removal proceedings.120 Some of the resources
still available to the Board and immigration judges were motions for
continuance (“continuance”) and status dockets; however, these tools proved
to be less efficient because of the significant difference between these
resources and administrative closure.121
i.

Motion for Continuance

In the Matter of Castro-Tum decision, Attorney General Sessions
stated that, although the regulations do not expressly confer immigration
judges the authority to generally use administrative closure, they do confer
the authority to grant continuances.122 A continuance is another docket
management tool available for immigration judges that allows them
to postpone a hearing to a future date.123 At first glance, a continuance may
seem like an excellent alternative to administrative closure; unfortunately,
it does not promote the same efficiency.
A continuance merely postpones a case to a future date, creating
repeated and unnecessary appearances before the immigration court;
118
John Gramlich, How Trump compares with other recent presidents in appointing federal judges,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/15/how-trumpcompares-with-other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/ (816 active judges serving in the
court system governed by Article III of the United States as of 2021); Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge, THE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge
(Aug 2, 2021) (showing there are 535 judges located in 66 immigration courts as of late 2021).
119
Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 (last visited May 5, 2022) (Civil Appeals declined by 3
percent; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit filings decreased by 10 percent); Immigration Court
Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR., https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited May
5, 2022) (Fiscal Year 2020 saw an increase of pending immigration cases to 1,246,164. Pending cases
increased the most from Fiscal Year 2018 (768,257) to Fiscal Year 2019 (1,023,767) after the Attorney
General decided Castro-Tum).
120
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 276 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
121
Id. at 276.
122
Id. at 283.
123
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 102, at 1; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (“The Immigration Judge
may grant a motion for continuance for a good cause shown.”).
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this occurs more frequently when a parallel case is pending in another agency
and the case has to be pushed back while it is still on the judge’s docket.124
A great example of this situation is Matter of Avetisyan, where the
immigration judge granted a total of five continuances while the respondent’s
case was still pending with USCIS.125 This lamentable misuse of time and
resources trumps the purpose of existing regulations, which is to ensure
“expeditious, fair, and proper resolution of matters coming before
Immigration Judges.”126
Moreover, aside from being less efficient than administrative closure,
continuances do not provide the same basis of regulatory relief that is
available solely through the use of administrative closure.127 This is the case
for respondents seeking a waiver of inadmissibility.128 An immigrant
is ineligible for the waiver if they are “in removal proceedings . . . unless the
removal proceedings are administratively closed and have not been
recalendared at the time of filing the application . . . .”129 A continuance does
not meet the statutory requirement, and the availability of this provisional
waiver to “almost any noncitizen in removal proceedings” will be nullified,
and many families could face potential separation.130
Conveniently, after Attorney General Sessions decided to limit the
general practice of administrative closure, he also decided to complicate
the attainment of continuances. This alternative was supposed to be the
optimal replacement for administrative closure.131 Without delay, and within
a few months after stripping judges of a vastly-relied-on authority,
Attorney General Sessions decided Matter of L-A-B-R-, where he held
that “an immigration judge should assess whether good cause supports
such a continuance by applying a multifactor analysis . . . .”132
124

See Brief of Retired Judges, supra note 95, at 22–23.
Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 689 (B.I.A. 2012). The counsel for DHS also admitted
that he did not have the file because it was with the agency and that the file was being sent back and forth
each time for each hearing. Id. at 689–90.
126
8 C.F.R. § 1003.12 (2019).
127
See Brief for Am. Immigr. Law.’s Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20–21,
Gonzalez-Penaloza v. Garland, 854 F.App’x. 637 (5th Cir. 2021) (No. A 205-665-068).
128
Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S,
https://www.uscis.gov/family/family-of-us-citizens/provisional-unlawful-presence-waivers (Jan. 5, 2018)
(“[I]mmigrant visa applicants who are immediate relatives . . . of U.S. citizens can apply for provisional
unlawful presence waivers before they leave the United States for their consular interview.”).
129
8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(iii) (2019).
130
Brief for Am. Immigr. Law.’s Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, GonzalezPenaloza, 854 F.App’x 637 (No. A 205-665-068).
131
See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 406 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
132
Id. An immigration judge should focus on two factors: “(1) likelihood that the alien will be recieve
collateral relief, and (2) whether that relief will materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings.”
Id. at 413. The Attorney General does not provide details on when a collateral relief will be sufficient for
a continuance; however, he does provide when a type of collateral relief will be sufficient to meet the good
cause. Id. at 413-14. Some examples of these situations involve (1) a continuance used to apply for a
provisional waiver, (2) when a respondent’s visa priority date is remote enough to raise the adjustment of
status prospect above a level of speculation, and (3) when the collateral relief has already been denied on
one occasion and no relevant change of circumstances are evident. Victoria Neilson et al., Practice
125
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The Attorney General further stated that the good-cause requirement should
not be abused and should be a vital check on the judge’s authority that reflects
the public’s interest in expediting this proceeding.133 By eliminating the
general use of administrative closure and limiting the instances when a judge
may grant a continuance, Attorney General Sessions consistently continues
to place obstacles that prohibit noncitizens from obtaining migratory relief.
Prior to the decision of Matter of L-A-B-R-, the DOJ started
scrutinizing the use of continuances. MaryBeth Keller, the Chief Immigration
Judge, issued a memorandum admitting that continuances contributed to
increases in processing times.134 A year later, and a few months before
Matter of L-A-B-R- was decided, James McHenry III, the EOIR Director,
issued a memorandum imposing benchmarks and performance metrics for
judges to follow.135 The Director stated that the immigration court system
and the EOIR are not an exception to the rule that “[a]lmost every trial court
system utilizes performance measures or case completion metrics” and
permitted performance measures, which he deemed necessary to ensure
optimal efficiency.136
This memorandum was significant because a few months later,
when he decided Matter of L-A-B-R-, Attorney General Sessions abrogated
Matter of Hashmi, which held that immigration judges could not consider
goal completions when deciding a motion for continuance.137 Therefore, the
decision to implement a performance metric system bolstered the idea that
administrative closure is necessary in the immigration system. Judges’
discretion had been further hindered, as they were now required to make the
critical choice of either meeting a deadline or suffering discipline or even
Advisory Seeking Continuances in Immigration Court in the Wake of the Attorney General’s Decision in
Matter of L-A-B-R-, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK 4, 5 (Dec. 6, 2018), https://cliniclegal.org/
resources/removal-proceedings/practice-advisory-matter-l-b-r-27-dec-405-ag-2018. Furthermore, there
are specific considerations to keep in mind when seeking for a continuance for the purpose of pursuing a
collateral relief. Id. at 11. Specific considerations are needed when a continuance is sought in familybased matters, when it is sought to pursue special juvenile immigrant status, for a U Nonimmigrant Status,
to pursue a T Nonimmigrant Status, to pursue a self-petition through VAWA, to pursue asylum with USCIS
with an unaccompanied Child, to pursue Adjustment of Status for an arriving immigrant, to pursue
Adjustment of Status through the Cuban Act, for a Post-Conviction Relief. Id. at 12, 18, 24, 27, 30, 32,
34, 36. These considerations have been laid out in previous BIA decisions, which Matter of L-A-B-R- did
not overrule. Rebecca Scholtz, AG Imposes Limitations on Motions for Continuance, CATH. LEGAL
IMMIGR. NETWORK (Aug. 20, 2018), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/removal-proceedings/ag-imposeslimitations-motions-continuance.
133
L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 405–406.
134
Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigr. J., on Continuances to All Immigr. JJ. et al.
1–3 (July 31, 2017) (on file with U.S. Dept. of Just.) (“[O]ver half of all cases surveyed had one or more
continuance, with an average in those cases of four continuances and 368 days of continuance, per case.”).
135
Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Dir. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., on Case Priorities
and Immigration Court Performance Measures to Off. of the Chief Immigr. J. et al. 2–3 (Jan. 17, 2018)
(on file with U.S. Dept. of Just.) [hereinafter J. McHenry Memo (2018)].
136
Id. at 3–4.
137
Matter of L-A-B-R- et al., 27 I&N Dec. 405 (AG 2018): AG Sets Rules for Continuances to Pursue
Collateral Relief, MYATTORNEYUSA, http://myattorneyusa.com/matter-of-l-a-b-r-et-al-27-iandn-dec405-ag-2018-ag-sets-rules-for-continuances-to-pursue-collateral (last visited May 5, 2022).
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termination.138 Goal completion metrics took a shot at the judges’ power to
control their docket, and they also targeted the appropriate due process and
fairness procedures that respondents deserve.139 Rushed decisions inevitably
seemed to have a negative impact on many decisions issued by judges.
Establishing a goal completion metric system was another successful
attempt to limit the immigration judge’s discretion. Moreover, after
Matter of L-A-B-R- was decided, the BIA decided Matter of L-N-Y-, which
made it even more difficult for a noncitizen to obtain a continuance while
awaiting USCIS adjudications.140
ii. Status Docket
Status dockets, which are used in many, but not all, immigration
courts, are a new management tool created in an EOIR memo from
January 2018 addressing the performance measures of continuances.141
Status dockets are inactive dockets that immigration judges use when they are
not ready to resolve a case.142 The early use of status dockets was clouded
with unanswered questions since they had only been introduced in a footnote
of the memorandum issued by the DOJ regarding performance metrics for
continuances.143 Status dockets’ use was inconsistent, and some judges opted
not to utilize it because there was a tremendous lack of guidance since
no official announcement was ever made.144
Many immigration judges sitting in jurisdictions where status dockets
were allowed opted to use continuances instead because of their concerns with
this newly-created tool, and administrative closure was no longer an option.145
These concerns were derived from the fact that, once the case was placed on
a status docket, the judge would no longer have control over it because
it would be transferred to the Assistant Chief Immigration Judge, limiting the
judge’s management over the case.146 Moreover, judges feared that the EOIR
could change its policy on status dockets in a way that could prejudice
respondents.147

138
Matthew Hoppock, Immigration Court “Status Docket” – the Secret Almost Alternative to
Administrative Closure, HOPPOCK LAW FIRM (NOV. 5, 2019), https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/
immigration-court-status-docket-the-secret-almost-alternative-to-administrative-closure.
139
Id.
140
See generally Matter of L-N-Y-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 755, 755 (B.I.A. 2020) (“In assessing whether to
grant an alien’s request for a continuance regarding an application for collateral relief, the alien’s prima
facie eligibility for relief and whether it will materially affect the outcome of proceedings are not
dispositive . . . .”).
141
Hoppock, supra note 139.
142
Rebecca Scholtz et al., Practice Advisory, Status Dockets in Immigration Courts, CATH. LEGAL
IMMIGR. NETWORK 2 (Sept. 30, 2019), https://cliniclegal.org/file-download/download/public/365.
143
Hoppock, supra note 139.
144
Id.
145
Scholtz, supra note 143, at 2 (also because most of these cases involved minor children).
146
Id.
147
Id.
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On August 16, 2019, EOIR Director James McHenry III issued
a memorandum regarding the use of status dockets, clarifying their purpose
and providing some guidance for their application.148 Although status dockets
are similar to administrative closure, they differ in fundamental aspects:
(1) they are not available in every immigration court, and (2) they are not
mentioned in any regulation.149 The August 16, 2019 memo further generated
confusion in different immigration courts across the country, mainly because
the memo limited the application of status dockets to three types of cases.150
Before the memorandum was issued, many respondents in different
immigration categories were eligible to have their cases placed on a status
docket; one of these categories was SIJ cases.151 This constraint forced judges
to either find a way to place their cases on a status docket or, by failing to do
so, issue a removal order against the young respondents.152 Narrowing the
use of an already complicated tool like a status docket further diminished
judges’ ability to govern their courtrooms and dockets.
C. Examining How the Immigration System was Impacted by the
Discontinuance of Administrative Closure
i.

Due Process and Fairness Concerns

Some procedural due process rights are extended to noncitizens
placed in removal proceedings.153 The Supreme Court has held that
“the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary,
or permanent.”154 Various decisions have also held that noncitizens enjoy
rights such as retaining counsel at no expense of the government, and a full

148
Memorandum from James R. McHenry III, Dir. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., on Use of Status
Dockets to All Immigr. Ct. Pers. (Aug. 16, 2019) (on file with U.S. Dept. of Just.).
149
Scholtz, supra note 143, at 2–3.
150
Lenni Benson & Alexandra Rizio, EOIR Policy Memo 19-13, “Use of Status Dockets” How the
Court Administration is Constraining Local Control, SAFE PASSAGE PROJECT (Sept. 4, 2019),
https://www.safepassageproject.org/2019/09/eoir-policy-memo-19-13-use-of-status-dockets-how-thecourt-administration-is-constraining-local-control (different judges in the state of New York have had
different understandings on what the language of the memorandum meant and are trying to figure out how
to place special immigrant juveniles on a status docket).
151
Immigration and Nationality Law Committee et al., Report on the Independence of the Immigration
Courts, N.Y. CITY BAR (OCT. 21, 2020), https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-services/
committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/independence-of-us-immigration-courts#_edn56. The Special
Immigrant Juvenile Status allows children who have been neglected by their parents to be eligible to adjust
their status and gain a permanent residency. Chapter 1: Purpose and Background, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR. SERV.’S, https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-6-part-j-chapter-1 (Aug. 12, 2021).
152
Benson & Rizio, supra note 151.
153
Gretchen Frazee, What constitutional rights do undocumented immigrants have?, PBS NEWS HOUR
(June 25, 2018, 5:08 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/what-constitutional-rights-doundocumented-immigrants-have.
154
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
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and fair hearing, among others.155 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held
that “[m]eticulous care must be exercised . . . [to] meet the essential standards
of fairness.”156 However, while noncitizens are entitled to due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment, there is great concern that many of these rights
are violated or constrained due to the immigration system’s structure and how
influential the President can be.157
This influence on the immigration system can be witnessed through
the different executive agencies in charge of separate proceedings.158
Since the President has the authority to remove the head of the DOJ at will,
the Attorney General is more prone to be politically influenced by the
President and make decisions that may jeopardize the procedural fairness of
noncitizens.159
Under former President Trump’s administration, the
Attorney General’s Office, more than any of its predecessors, liberally used
its review certification power to issue decisions that transformed
the immigration system and due process rights of noncitizens.160
Matter of Castro-Tum is one of those decisions. The former administration
has “eroded” the safeguards of immigration judges by instituting policies that
exert an unprecedented amount of control over immigration judges;
an example of this is how the goal completion metrics are paired with the new
standard that governs the approval or denial of a continuance.161
The due process of noncitizens was gravely affected by the DOJ’s
goal completion metrics established in 2018.162 According to the new metric
guidelines, judges must complete 700 cases per year.163 Perhaps the most
shocking benchmark on the list of new guideline metrics found in the
memorandum is “Benchmark 5,” which states that “[n]inety-five percent
(95%) of all hearings should be completed on the initial scheduled individual
merits hearing date.”164 The establishment of the performance metric system
is an unequivocal assault on immigrants’ due process rights as the judges’
155
Id.; Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. REV. 707,
719 (2019); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”).
156
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
157
Marouf, supra note 155, at 723.
158
Id. at 725 (“Most of the executive branch’s authority over immigration is wielded through powerful
administrative agencies.”).
159
See e.g., Daniel Cotter, The Attorney General Should be Separate, HARV. L. POL’Y REV. (Apr. 22,
2020), https://harvardlpr.com/2020/04/22/the-attorney-general-should-be-separate.
160
Kim Bellware, On immigration, Attorney General Barr is his own Supreme Court. Judges and
lawyers say that’s a problem., WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
immigration/2020/03/05/william-barr-certification-power.
161
See generally Letter from Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Sen., on Immigration Court Independence to
William Barr, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Feb. 13, 2020) (on file with author).
162
See generally J. McHenry Memo (2018), supra note 136, at 3, 5 (describing the goal completion
metric).
163
National Association of Immigration Judges: Hearing on The State of Judicial Independence and
Due Process in U.S. Immigration Courts Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. and Citizenship, 116th Cong. 4
(2020) (statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. JJ.).
164
J. McHenry Memo (2018), supra note 136, at app. A.

Published by eCommons, 2022

218

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

discretion was actively being taken away, resulting in a negative effect on the
immigration system as a whole. Judges should be able to manage their docket
at the convenience of the court and the convenience of both parties involved
without any miscarriage of justice towards the noncitizen placed in removal
proceedings. By removing administrative closure as an available tool for
judges, which narrowed the circumstances when continuances are granted and
imposed new guideline metrics, the DOJ attacked the immigration system and
its integrity, as well as due process and fairness.
Experts in immigration law did not take long to scrutinize this weak
attempt to reduce the backlog in the immigration courts while also trying to
fill the void left by the abolition of administrative closure.165 The main issue
with that new policy is that fairness will be severely undermined because
judges, “[w]ith a clock constantly ticking over their heads,” will have to face
the tough decision of “choo[sing] between guaranteeing justice or losing their
jobs.”166 Noncitizens deserve a hearing before an “impartial adjudicator” that
will allow them to examine the evidence, present evidence, and examine
witnesses as well.167 Immigration proceedings are overly complex, mainly
because various agencies may handle a single case simultaneously.168 The
wide array of agencies that may have a stake in a case is among the many
factors out of an immigration judge’s hands that may force the continuance
of a case.169

165
The Need for an Independent Immigration Court Grows More Urgent As DOJ Imposes Quotas on
Immigration Judges, AM. IMMIGR. LAW.’S ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/pressreleases/2018/need-independent-court-doj-judges (President of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association stated that “[this] will force judges to choose between guaranteeing justice or losing their jobs.
With a clock constantly ticking over their heads, judges cannot possibly issue well-reasoned decisions . . .
.”); Kathryn P. Russell, Performance Metrics for Immigration Judges: A Matter of Judicial Efficiency or
an Erosion of Independent Judiciary?, 3 ATTORNEY AT L. MAG. CLEV. ED., no. 10, at 15,
https://mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?m=35698&i=452866&p=14&ver=html5 (“While general
performance metrics can be seen as facially innocuous, the suggestion sparked an immediate backlash from
immigration advocates claiming that the measures would ‘threaten the integrity of the immigration court
system and undermine judicial independence.’”).
166
By the Numbers: Why Quotas on Immigration Judges Will Adversely Impact the Court’s Backlog,
NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGR. JUDGES 2–3, https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/publications/
By_the_Numbers_-_3-13-18.pdf; AM. IMMIGR. LAW.’S ASS’N, supra note 165. The National Association
of Immigration Judges is a voluntary group of immigration judges who have made their mission to promote
efficiency, dignity, and professionalism of the Immigration Courts. Home, NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGR.
JUDGES, https://www.naij-usa.org (last visited May 6, 2022).
167
Whitehouse, supra note 161, at 2.
168
Megan Davy et al., Who Does What in U.S. Immigration, (Dec. 1, 2005),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/who-does-what-us-immigration; US Government Agencies
Involved in The Immigration Process, HACKING IMMIGR. L., https://thevisafirm.com/dc-immigrationlawyer/us-government-agencies-involved/ (last visited May 6, 2022).
169
NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGR. JJ., supra note 166, at 3; Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 689
(B.I.A. 2012) (The respondent had filed a visa petition but was waiting for her husband to become
a naturalized U.S. citizen. The judge had no other choice but to continue the case more than once due to
the fact that DHS did not have the file because it was with the “visa petition unit.”). Other factors that may
have to result in a continuance by the judge are illness by any party in the case, failure to appear by the
interpreter of the case, and lengthy testimony among other things. Id.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol47/iss2/3

2022]

Matter of Castro-Tum & the AG

219

Administrative closure allows the respondent an opportunity to seek
alternative relief while the judge pauses their removal proceedings.170
The narrowly construed guideline to issue continuances, and an overly
intrusive performance metric system without administrative closure, ordering
the removal of a noncitizen when other valid alternatives are available
infringes on their rights.171 It was not easy to imagine a system where
a noncitizen has relief available but cannot apply for it because having their
case administratively closed was required.172 Moreover, there were instances
where an immigrant in removal proceedings, seeking meritorious relief, was
required to have their case administratively closed in order to apply for it. 173
One of those instances was the waiver of grounds of inadmissibility pursuant
to 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e), which states that an alien is ineligible for a provisional
waiver if the immigrant is in removal proceedings unless the proceedings are
administratively closed.174 Matter of Castro-Tum seriously impacted
noncitizens who were in the process of obtaining a benefit from an immediate
qualifying relative.175
ii. The Backlog in the Courts
In the past, one of the most concerning issues in the immigration court
system was the court’s growing backlog due to the vast number of pending
cases.176 Statistics favor the use of administrative closure as a tool for judges
to manage their dockets when they deem it appropriate.177 The number of
pending cases grew exponentially from 2016 to 2020, specifically from
500,000 to 1,281,586 cases.178 One goal of the Trump Administration was to
170

Brief of Retired Judges, supra note 95, at 21–22, 25.
Id. at 21 (citing Vahora v. Holder, 626 F.3d 907, 918 (7th Cir. 2010)).
172
Letter from A. Ashley Tabaddor, President Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. JJ., on Aministrative Closure of
Removal Cases Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 187 (Att’y Gen. 2018) to Hon. Jeff Sessions
(Jan. 30, 2018).
173
Id.
174
8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(iii) (2020). “[A] person seeking admission must overcome the
inadmissibility grounds.” Richard A. Boswell, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 33 (5th ed. 2020).
A waiver of inadmissibility is “forgiveness” of the ground of inadmissibility. Waivers of Inadmissibility:
Who Is Eligible and How to Apply, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/waiversinadmissibility-who-is-eligible-how-apply (last visited May 8, 2022). In order to apply for a provisional
waiver, I-601A, noncitizens in removal proceedings need to have their case administratively closed.
8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(iii) (2020).
175
Consular Processing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S, https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/green-card-processes-and-procedures/consular-processing (May 4, 2018). “Consular processing is
required to secure the immigrant visa, but the respondent needs a waiver for unlawful presence under INA
section 212(a)(9)(B)(v) to ensure expeditious processing abroad for purposes of family unity.”
Tabaddor, supra note 172.
176
Gaby Del Valle, Immigration Courts Under Trump: Backlogs and Courts Independence,
DOCUMENTED (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:14 PM), https://documentedny.com/2020/10/14/analysis-how-trump-haschanged-the-immigration-courts/. There are currently 1,755,934 pending cases in the U.S. Immigration
Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR., https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/
(last visited May 5, 2022).
177
TRAC IMMIGR., supra note 118.
178
Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR.,
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited May 5, 2022).
171
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decrease the number of pending cases; not only was this not accomplished,
but the number of pending immigration cases in the United States is
the highest it has ever seen.179 When he decided Matter of Castro-Tum,
Attorney General Sessions stated that administrative closure contributed to
the backlog of the American immigration court system; nonetheless,
if administrative closure had never been used, there would still be an increase
of pending cases by twenty-four percent.180
Inevitably, a steady rise in the number of pending cases increased the
average time it takes to complete a case. Currently, the average length of
a case is 934 days, exceeding the average time that a case took in 2015 by
almost 300 days.181 A dramatic increase in the court’s backlog was easily
foreseeable, as eliminating such a useful docket management tool would
undoubtedly have severe repercussions.182
D. Examining the Battle Between the Courts and the Department of Justice
i.

Auer Deference and Administrative Closure

Courts should not have afforded deference to the Attorney General’s
interpretation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b). Auer deference
played an essential role in determining whether administrative closure
should have been upheld or vacated.183 Auer deference, also called
Seminole Rock deference, states that a court reviewing an agency’s
interpretation of their regulation should defer to their construction of said
interpretation as long as it is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”184 Auer deference, which had been notoriously controversial and
criticized for many years because it conferred agencies with an “inordinately
strong level of judicial deference,” was recently narrowed in
Kisor v. Wilkie.185 This Supreme Court decision narrowed the construction of
Auer deference to three principles that courts would have to take into account
before applying Auer deference: (1) the regulation must be deemed genuinely
ambiguous after exhausting all tools of construction; (2) it must be

179

Del Valle, supra note 176.
TRAC IMMIGR., supra note 118.
181
TRAC IMMIGR., supra note 178 (This was based on the entire United States for the fiscal year
2021 compared to the fiscal year 2015 which averaged 643 days).
182
See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF IMMIGR. JUDGES, supra note 166.
183
Auer deference is a deference that applies to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations. See
Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 175 (2014).
184
Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effects on
Agency Rules, 119 COL. L. REV. 85 (2019).
185
139 S. Ct. at 2414 (holding that even though Auer deference will be upheld, it would be expanded);
Nicholas R. Bednar, Comment, Defying Auer Deference, 100 MINN. L. REV. (2015). Justice Thurgood
Marshall and Justice Antonin Scalia were avid critics of the Seminole deference doctrine. Kevin O. Leske,
Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Approach to Agency Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 219,
233 (2013).
180
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reasonable; and (3) the character of the agency interpretation is entitled to
controlling weight.186
Attorney General Sessions’ decision to end administrative closure
was not welcomed with open arms by some courts. For example,
the Fourth Circuit Court rejected Matter of Castro-Tum in a case decided in
August of 2019.187 Almost a year after, the Seventh Circuit Court decided
Morales v. Barr, another important decision about administrative closure,
which along with the Fourth Circuit’s decision, signaled that judges were not
going to “tolerate an unreasonable interpretation of law. . . .”188 In both
instances, the courts’ reasoning relied on Auer deference and focused on
whether the regulation was “sufficiently” ambiguous to be deferred to the
agency for interpretation.189 The courts concluded, rightly so, that the
regulation’s language unambiguously conferred immigration judges and
the BIA authority to use administrative closure as a tool.190
Under the new and narrowly construed Auer deference,
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) and 1003.10(b) were not genuinely ambiguous
because of their expansive language, specifically the word “any” paired with
the words “appropriate and necessary.”191 Both the Fourth and the
Seventh Circuit Courts used a similar rationale regarding the expansiveness
of the language in §§ 1003.1 and 1003.10 by holding that the
Attorney General’s interpretation of this regulation did not deserve
Auer deference because of its lack of ambiguity.192 The Third Circuit Court
also used a similar rationale when it vacated Matter of Castro-Tum, stating
that “the plain language establishes that general administrative closure
186

Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–16.
Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282, 297 (4th Cir. 2019). “[The statutes] unambiguously confer upon
IJs and the BIA the general authority to administratively close cases such that the BIA’s decision should
be vacated and remanded.” Id. “[W]e conclude that the relevant regulations confer the general authority
to administratively close cases to IJs and the BIA.” Id. In Romero v. Barr, Jesus Zuniga Romero had an
approved I-130 petition and intended to file a provisional waiver I-601A due to the fact that his wife had
become a U.S. Citizen. Id. But in order to apply for a provisional waiver, his removal case had to be
administratively closed pursuant to federal regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(iii) (2020).
188
See AM. IMMIGR. LAW.’S ASS’N, supra note 16; Morales v. Barr, 973 F.3d 656, 656 (7th Cir. 2020).
Yeison Meza Morales was a shooting victim who applied for a U-Visa, which was pending when ICE
initiated removal proceedings. Id. at 659. He appeared pro se in front of the Immigration Judge and
explained that he had a U-Visa pending, to which the judge agreed to continue the case for thirty days, but
he was ordered removed due to the fact that the U-Visa was still pending even though he sought another
continuance or his case to be administratively closed. Id. at 659–60. U Nonimmigrant Visa applies
to people who have been a victim of a qualifying crime within the United States, and who has collaborated
with the investigation of such crime. Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status,
U. S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-of-human-traffickingand-other-crimes/victims-of-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (Feb. 28, 2022); Morales, 973 F.3d at
660.
189
Romero, 937 F.3d at 290; Morales, 973 F.3d at 664; see AM. IMMIGR. LAW.’S ASS’N, supra note 16.
190
Morales, 973 F.3d at 667; Romero, 937 F.3d at 292. Even if the court had not determined that the
language was not sufficiently ambiguous, “a court may not defer to a new interpretation, whether or not
introduced in litigation, that creates ‘unfair surprise’ to regulated parties.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400,
2417–18 (2019).
191
Romero, 937 F.3d at 288.
192
Id. at 290; Morales, 973 F.3d at 664.
187
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authority is unambiguously authorized by these regulations.”193 Moreover,
even if the Courts had found that the regulations’ language was ambiguous,
the Courts should not have granted the Attorney General deference because
the new interpretation created an “unfair surprise to regulated parties” due to
the interpretation’s significant shift from precedent.194
ii. New Regulation Issued by the EOIR Regarding Administrative
Closure
After the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts’ decisions overturned
Matter of Castro-Tum and restored administrative closure in their respective
jurisdictions, the EOIR issued an NPRM.195 One primary purpose of
the proposed rule was to amend §§ 1003.1 and 1003.10 to eliminate the
authority of immigration judges and BIA members to use administrative
closure, even in jurisdictions where Matter of Castro-Tum had been
vacated.196 This proposed rule was issued after administrative closure and
remained controversial in different jurisdictions.197 The DOJ stated that
“[n]otwithstanding the Attorney General’s controlling interpretation of the
law under [federal law], the question whether [the regulations] allow[ed]
immigration judges and Board members to indefinitely adjourn immigration
[cases] through . . . administrative closure continues to drive litigation . . . .”198
After receiving 1,284 comments from interested entities, on
December 16, 2020, the EOIR and the DOJ issued the Rule, set to go into
effect starting January 15, 2021, only a few days before President Biden’s
inauguration.199 This regulation amendment meant that immigration judges
and BIA members would have to abide by the Rule, even in jurisdictions that

193
See Sanchez v. Att’y Gen. United States, 997 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2021) (using the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits as guidance to come to a decision).
194
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417–18 (citations omitted).
195
Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings, 85 Fed. Reg. 52491
(Aug. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240). Rulemaking is the process in which an agency
formulates, amends, or repeals a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012). A rule is a statement of an agency that
has general applicability and future effect. Todd Garvey, A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial
Review, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 1 (2017).
196
Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings, 85 Fed. Reg. 52491,
52492 (Aug. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. and 1003, 1240). “The Department [of Justice] . . .
proposes to amend the regulations to make clear that there is no freestanding authority of line immigration
judges or BIA members to administratively close cases.” Id. at 52491.
197
Id. at 52497.
198
Id.
199
Centro Legal de La Raza et al., v. Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev. et al., 524 F. Supp. 3d 919, 935
(N.D. Cal. 2021) (The vast number of comments received signal to the importance of administrative
closure in the immigration law field.); Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration
Proceedings; Administrative Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 81588 (Dec. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
1003 and 1240). Since the final rule’s effective date was a few days before President Biden’s inauguration,
and also prior to the regulatory memo to freeze these regulations, the provisions of the rule are in effect
and are not subject to the sixty-day implementation delay.
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overturned Matter of Castro-Tum.200 More importantly, the Rule’s provisions
applied to initiated, reopened, or even recalendared cases, which suggested
that the government could reopen administratively closed cases in
jurisdictions that vacated the Attorney General’s decision.201
The Rule created “sweeping changes” to the already complicated
immigration system and, among other things, supplemented
Matter of Castro-Tum under the conception that it was necessary to clarify
and resolve the varying interpretations of §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(iii) and 1003.10(b),
which resulted from courts misapplying administrative closure.202 The
implementation of the Rule only generated further controversy. Many entities
criticized the process through which the Rule was incorporated, stating that
the DOJ had not allowed enough time for commenters to prepare responses
to the NPRM.203 Typically, thirty days is the reasonable amount of time that
an agency may provide for commenters to voice their opinions on a proposed
rule; however, an agency may offer a more extended period of time, especially
in extenuating circumstances.204
This controversy drove the Ninth Circuit Court to temporarily enjoin
the EOIR from implementing the Rule. It found that the DOJ and the EOIR
had engaged in “arbitrary and capricious decision-making” since the agencies
did not provide evidence to justify the elimination of administrative closure
on efficiency grounds.205 The temporary injunction meant that the Rule would
be on hold, and the Seventh and Fourth Circuit Courts regained the authority
to use administrative closure.
E. Examining Potential Solutions that Could Have Been Implemented to
Solve an Issue of this Magnitude
Within a few days after taking office, President Biden issued
an executive order directing the review of current regulations and orders that
impede “access to immigration benefits and fair, efficient adjudications of
these benefits” in order to get recommendations on how to remove these
barriers.206 Before vacating Matter of Castro-Tum at a national level, the
newly published Rule by the EOIR needed to be repealed in some way.
200
Garvey, supra note 195, at 1. “Rules that are issued in compliance with certain legal requirements,
and that fall within the scope of authority delegated to the agency by Congress, have the force and effect
of law.” Id.
201
Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative Closure,
85 Fed. Reg. 81588, 81647 (Dec. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003 and 1240).
“[A]ny administratively closed case can be reopened by the court or BIA.” Jessica Suotmaa, Are
Administratively Closed Immigration Court Cases Still “Safe”?, LUM L. GRP. (May. 25, 2018),
http://www.lumlawgroup.com/are-administratively-closed-immigration-court-cases-still-safe/.
202
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203
Id. at 935.
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See infra Part E.ii.; Executive Order 12866 states that an agency “should include a comment period
of not less than 60 days” in most cases. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Sept. 30, 1993).
205
Centro Legal de la Raza, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 954–55.
206
Exec. Order No. 14,012, 86 Fed. Reg. 8227 (Feb. 2, 2021).

Published by eCommons, 2022

224

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:2

If Matter of Castro-Tum had not been overturned, the following are some of
the potential ways this issue could have been resolved.
i.

Congressional Review Act

Aside from the standard rulemaking procedures prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which establishes the process of
issuing, amending, or repealing a rule, administrations may also rely on
another action to reverse previous regulations.207 The Congressional Review
Act (“CRA”) of 1996 could have been used to “undo” the previous
administration’s regulations; as a matter of fact, it has been used in the past
by other presidents to repeal regulations that challenged their political
views.208 The CRA establishes certain procedures that Congress may use to
repeal regulatory rules, mainly by a joint resolution of disapproval.209 This
path to reverse previous regulations is more expeditious than the typical
notice of proposed rulemaking; the principal requirement is the passage of a
joint resolution by both the House of Representatives and the Senate along
with the President’s signature.210 The CRA’s employment is not a novel tactic
and has been used to reverse regulatory provisions disliked by
an administration since some presidents have “abused” this tool.211
The Trump administration made sure to “[n]ullify, postpone, suspend, stay,
and replace” some of former President Obama’s environmental regulations
by employing the CRA.212
The CRA is “of particular interest when a new Congress and
President take office because it provides an opportunity for the new Congress
to review certain regulations issued by the previous administration” and
because of the immediacy in which the regulation comes to an end.213
Furthermore, the CRA is a powerful resource because it prevents
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the promulgation of “substantially the same” regulations as the disapproved
rule, unlike a regular repeal.214
When President Biden took office, 1,400 rules were finalized by the
previous administration that fell subject to a joint dissolution approval under
the CRA.215 Most importantly, the Rule issued by the EOIR was one of them;
however, the CRA has one caveat: it does not allow legislators to overturn
multiple rules at once.216 The limited use of the CRA could have been
particularly problematic because it was up to the new President and
Congress’s discretion to choose which regulations were in dire need of being
overturned, especially in matters deemed more pressing like regulations made
by the Environmental Protection Agency.217 Nevertheless, problematic did
not mean impossible.
ii. Agency Rulemaking
Agency Rulemaking was another path the Biden administration could
have taken to repeal the new regulation.218 Although it is not as immediate
as overturning a regulation through the use of the CRA, agency rulemaking
was still an effective way of amending or even repealing a rule, and the
process is not complicated, merely time-consuming:
[A]n agency generally must first provide notice that it intends
to promulgate a rule. An agency does this by publishing
a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.
The notice must provide (1) the time, place, and nature of the
rulemaking proceedings; (2) a reference to the legal authority
under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or
subject of the proposed rule. The agency must then allow
“interested persons an opportunity” to comment on the
proposed rule. Typically, an agency will provide at least
30 days for public comment. The agency is required to
review the public comments and respond to “significant”
214
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comments received, and it may make changes to the proposal
based on those comments.219
Ultimately, even though the rulemaking process may have been longer, it
remained a valid option to restore authority to the immigration judges and the
BIA to use administrative closure.
iii. Executive Orders
An executive order is an administrative tool available to carry out
functions that the President would not otherwise pursue through Congress.220
Executive orders are controversial because they circumvent the
administrative rulemaking process, which provides for discussion and judicial
review.221 For a President’s executive order to have the effect of federal law,
Congress must have delegated authority to the executive branch through
a statute under the nondelegation doctrine.222
One of the critical questions regarding the implementation of
executive orders has been whether a President can utilize them to amend
a regulation already codified in the Federal Register.223 This question arose
under former President Trump’s administration when he amended
a regulation, rather than guiding the agency to do it, regarding the
administrative judges’ hiring process.224 Former President Trump issued this
executive order by invoking 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301 and 3302, which allowed him
to prescribe adequate regulations.225 President Biden could have potentially
issued an executive order amending the Rule about administrative closure;
however, it is vital to keep in mind that the President can only issue
an executive order if authorized by “an act of Congress or . . . the Constitution
itself.”226
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The Constitution speaks very little about who will be the regulator of
immigration law, making the Supreme Court the initial source and entity
responsible for shaping this field.227 Congress has unfettered authority to
restrict noncitizen’s entry, which means that the executive branch will also
possess most of this authority through delegation.228 Congress created the
INA in the 20th century, and under § 212(f), the President has broad authority
to restrict the entrance of persons or classes of persons.229 Although the
President has, as many would say, “broad” authority under § 212(f), it would
have been tough for President Biden to issue an executive order amending
the recently issued Rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, the immigration court system has been, and will
always be, in dire need of a tool like administrative closure to ensure the fair
adjudication of immigration cases. Judges should be in control of their
dockets, and they should have tools at their disposal to help them manage their
cases accordingly. By halting a practice that had been ratified on many
occasions by the DOJ and the BIA, the Attorney General went against
precedent and directly attacked the “heart of a court’s responsibility”—
the efficient management of dockets.230 It created confusion among
immigration lawyers and advocates. The Attorney General tried fixing
something unbroken, and the consequences could not have been more
damaging. Serious ramifications, like the unprecedented backlog in the
immigration system, cannot go unnoticed.
The Attorney General erroneously decided Matter of Castro-Tum;
it was used as a vehicle to implement former President Trump’s ruthless
immigration policy. It stripped judges of a power they had been using for
decades, and the Attorney General failed to provide them with an optimal
replacement. As a matter of fact, instead of finding a way for judges to cope
with the absence of this helpful tool, he diminished their discretion even
further by imposing draconian policies that would do nothing other than
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obfuscate their judgment. Continuances and status dockets are practical tools,
but they are constrained, making them an inadequate replacement.
Attorney General Sessions, through his certification tool, issued
a decision that created havoc in the immigration system. It is extremely
important to address this power because, although administrative closure was
restored, nothing prevents a future Attorney General from stripping judges of
this essential judicial review tool.
Of equal importance, this Comment emphasizes the fact that the
immigration system is politicized and lacks the necessary independence to
function efficiently. The Attorney General has broad power to make
precedential decisions that, even though they may not be in the best interest
of the immigration field, still reflect the political views of the sitting
administration.
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